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When  firms  are  able  to  pledge  their  assets  as  collateral,  investment  and  borrowing  become
endogenous: pledgeable assets support more borrowings that in turn allow for further investment in
pledgeable assets. We show that this credit multiplier has an important impact on investment when
firms face credit constraints: investment-cash flow sensitivities are increasing in the degree of
tangibility of constrained firms' assets. If firms are unconstrained, however, investment-cash flow
sensitivities are unaffected by asset tangibility. Crucially, asset tangibility itself may determine
whether a firm faces credit constraints - firms with more tangible assets may have greater access to
external funds. This implies that the relationship between capital spending and cash flows is non-
monotonic in the firm's asset tangibility. Our theory allows us to use a differences-in-differences
approach to identify the effect of financing frictions on corporate investment: we compare the
differential effect of asset tangibility on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow across different
regimes  of  financial  constraints.  We  implement  this  testing  strategy  on  a  large  sample  of
manufacturing firms drawn from COMPUSTAT between 1985 and 2000. Our tests allow for the
endogeneity of the firm's credit status, with asset tangibility influencing whether a firm is classified
as credit constrained or unconstrained in a switching regression framework. The data strongly
support our hypothesis about the role of asset tangibility on corporate investment under financial
constraints.
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Whether ￿nancing frictions in￿ uence real investment decisions is a central matter in contemporary
￿nance (Stein (2003)). Various theories explore the interplay between ￿nancing frictions and invest-
ment to study issues ranging from ￿rm organizational design (e.g., Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein
(1997)) to optimal hedging and cash policies (Froot et al. (1993) and Almeida et al. (2004)). Unfor-
tunately, identifying ￿nancing￿ investment interactions in the data is not an easy task. The standard
identi￿cation strategy is based on the methodology proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988).1 Those authors
argue that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds should increase with the wedge between the
costs of internal and external funds (monotonicity hypothesis). Accordingly, one should be able to
gauge the impact of credit imperfections on corporate spending by comparing the sensitivity of invest-
ment to cash ￿ ow across samples of ￿rms sorted on proxies for ￿nancing frictions. A number of recent
papers, however, have questioned the validity of the Fazzari et al. approach. Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) argue that the monotonicity hypothesis is not a necessary implication of optimal investment
under constrained ￿nancing, and report evidence that contradicts Fazzari et al.￿ s ￿ndings. Work
by Erickson and Whited (2000), Gomes (2001), and Alti (2003) further suggests that the patterns
reported by Fazzari et al. are consistent with models in which ￿nancing frictions play no role.
In this paper, we develop and test a theoretical argument that allows one to identify whether
￿nancing imperfections a⁄ect ￿rm investment behavior. We explore the idea that variables that in-
crease a ￿rm￿ s ability to contract external ￿nance may in￿ uence observed investment spending when
investment demand is constrained by credit imperfections. One such variable is the tangibility of
a ￿rm￿ s assets. Assets that are more tangible sustain more external ￿nancing, because tangibility
mitigates contractibility problems ￿ asset tangibility increases the value that can be recaptured by
creditors in default states.2 Through a simple contracting model that draws on Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), we show that investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities will be increasing in the tangibility of con-
strained ￿rms￿assets. In contrast, tangibility will have no e⁄ect on investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities
of ￿nancially unconstrained ￿rms. Crucially, asset tangibility itself a⁄ects the credit status of the
￿rm: ￿rms with very tangible (pledgeable) assets are likely to become unconstrained. This implies
a non-monotonic e⁄ect of tangibility on investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities.
In a nutshell, our theory predicts that at relatively low levels of tangibility, the sensitivity of invest-
ment spending to cash ￿ ow increases with asset tangibility. However, this e⁄ect ceases to exist at high
1A partial list of papers that use the Fazzari et al. methodology includes Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Fazzari
and Petersen (1993), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Bond and Meghir (1994), Calomiris and Hubbard (1995),
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and Kadapakkam et al. (1998). See Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive survey.
2Our proxies for asset tangibility do not measure the ratio of tangible to intangible assets in the ￿rm￿ s balance sheet,
but rather gauge the degree of salability or the ease of redeployment of a ￿rm￿ s assets by its creditors. Hereinafter,
the term ￿tangibility￿is meant to summarize these characteristics, rather than how hard are a ￿rm￿ s assets.
1levels of tangibility, as highly tangible ￿rms become ￿nancially unconstrained. This prediction allows
us to formulate an empirical test of the interplay between ￿nancial constraints and investment that
uses a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences approach. We identify the e⁄ect of ￿nancing frictions on investment by
comparing the di⁄erential e⁄ect of asset tangibility on the sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow across
di⁄erent (endogenously determined) regimes of ￿nancial constraints. In contrast to Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997), we argue that investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities can be used as a means to gauge the im-
pact of ￿nancing frictions on real investment. However, the conditions under which identi￿cation oc-
curs also suggest that investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities are not monotonically related to the degree of
￿nancing constraints. In this sense, the relationship between tangibility and investment￿ cash ￿ ow sen-
sitivities that we identify agrees with Kaplan and Zingales￿ s critique of the monotonicity hypothesis.
Our empirical approach provides a way to sidestep some of the problems associated with prior
work on ￿nancial constraints. Because we focus on the di⁄erential e⁄ect of asset tangibility on
investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities across constrained and unconstrained ￿rms, it is hard to argue
that our results could be generated by a model with no ￿nancing frictions in which poor proxies for
investment opportunities (such as Q) are employed (cf. Erickson and Whited (2000) and Alti (2003)).
We recognize that problems with proxy quality might imply a di⁄erent bias for the absolute levels
of the estimated investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities across constrained and unconstrained samples.
However, our empirical test focuses on the marginal e⁄ect of asset tangibility on investment sensitiv-
ities. In order to generate our hypothesis in a model with frictionless ￿nancing, one would need to
generate residuals from poor proxies for investment opportunities that have very special properties.
Speci￿cally, these residuals would need to load onto variations in asset tangibility di⁄erentially across
samples of ￿nancially constrained and unconstrained ￿rms, and do so precisely along the lines of the
predictions of our theory. We ￿nd it di¢ cult to articulate a good rationale for such a story. However,
to verify that our empirical results cannot be explained away by mismeasurement and other biases,
our analysis also employs the expectations GMM estimator proposed by Cummins et al. (1999), the
measurement error-consistent estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000), and the Euler-based model
of capital investment of Bond and Meghir (1994).
We test our hypothesis on a large sample of manufacturing ￿rms drawn from the COMPUSTAT
tapes between 1985 and 2000. We estimate investment equations that resemble those of Fazzari et al.
(1988), but include an interaction term that captures the e⁄ect of tangibility on investment￿ cash ￿ ow
sensitivities. These equations are ￿tted over subsamples that are identi￿ed based on the likelihood
that ￿rms face constrained access to capital markets. Importantly, our main tests do not rely on
standard a priori assignments of ￿rms into ￿nancial constraint categories. Instead, we look at cross-
sectional di⁄erences in investment using a switching regression approach in which the probability
2that ￿rms face constrained access to credit is jointly estimated with the investment equations. In
this approach, we closely follow the prior work of Hu and Schiantarelli (1997) and Hovakimian and
Titman (2004). However, in line with our theory, we also include asset tangibility as a determinant of
the constraint status. To allow for comparability with existing research, in complementary tests we
follow the bulk of the literature and assign observations into groups of constrained and unconstrained
￿rms based on characteristics such as payout policy, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings.
We conduct most of our tests using a detailed ￿rm-level measure of asset tangibility (based on
Berger et al. (1996)). This empirical proxy suits our analysis in that it gauges the expected liqui-
dation value of ￿rms￿main categories of operating assets in every year of our sample (namely, liquid
securities, accounts receivable, inventories, and ￿xed capital). However, because a ￿rm￿ s choices may
a⁄ect the tangibility of its assets, there could exist some degree of endogeneity in ￿rm-level measures
of tangibility. To ensure that an ￿endogenous asset tangibility￿story does not underlie our results,
we use two additional industry-level measures of asset tangibility throughout the analysis.
Our tests show that asset tangibility positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of
investment of ￿nancially constrained ￿rms, but that tangibility drives no shifts in those sensitivities
when ￿rms are unconstrained. The results are identical whether we use maximum likelihood switch-
ing regression models, traditional OLS, or error-consistent GMM estimators, and for both ￿rm- and
industry-level tangibility proxies. In addition, consistent with our priors, the switching regression es-
timator suggests that higher tangibility makes it more likely that a ￿rm will be classi￿ed as ￿nancially
unconstrained. The e⁄ect of asset tangibility on constrained ￿rms￿investments is also economically
signi￿cant. For example, a one-standard-deviation shock to cash ￿ ow increases annual investment
spending by approximately 9 cents (per dollar of ￿xed capital) for ￿rms at the ￿rst quartile of our
base measure of asset tangibility. In contrast, the same shock increases investment by more than 20
cents for ￿rms at the third quartile of that tangibility measure.
Our study is not the ￿rst attempt at designing a test strategy for ￿nancial constraints that tries to
mitigate the problems in Fazzari et al. (1988). In that vein, Whited (1992) and Hubbard et al. (1995)
adopt an Euler equation approach that recovers the intertemporal ￿rst-order conditions for investment
across samples of constrained and unconstrained ￿rms. As discussed by Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), however, the Euler equation approach is unable to identify constraints when ￿rms are as con-
strained today as they are in the future. Moreover, this approach may reject the null of perfect capital
markets for reasons other than ￿nancing frictions (e.g., misspeci￿cation in production technologies).
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap et al. (1994) compare the investment and inventory behav-
ior of constrained and unconstrained ￿rms over business and monetary policy cycles. Our methodol-
ogy, in contrast, dispenses with the need to use exogenous macroeconomic movements to identify the
3impact of ￿nancing frictions on ￿rm behavior. Blanchard et al. (1994), Lamont (1997), and Rauh
(2006) explore ￿natural experiments￿to bypass the need to control for investment opportunities in in-
vestment equations featuring cash ￿ ows. One limitation of their approach, however, is the di¢ culty in
generalizing the ￿ndings derived from natural experiments across other empirical settings (see Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin (2000)). The methodology we propose, in contrast, can be used in a number of dif-
ferent contexts in which ￿nancing constraints might in￿ uence investment. Almeida et al. (2004) pro-
pose using the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of cash (as opposed to capital expenditures) to gauge the e⁄ect of
￿nancial constraints on ￿rm policies. While Almeida et al. only relate ￿nancial constraints to a ￿nan-
cial variable, this study helps establish a link between ￿nancing frictions and real corporate decisions.
In all, the analysis of this paper provides a unique complement to the extant literature, suggesting new
dimensions and ways in which to study the impact of ￿nancial constraints on real corporate behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out a simple model
that formalizes our hypothesis about the relationship between investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities, as-
set tangibility, and ￿nancial constraints. In Section 3, we use our proposed empirical strategy to test
for ￿nancial constraints in a large sample of ￿rms. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
To identify the e⁄ect of tangibility on investment we study a simple theoretical framework in which
￿rms have limited ability to pledge cash ￿ ows from new investments. We use Hart and Moore￿ s
(1994) inalienability of human capital assumption to justify limited pledgeability, since this allows us
to derive our main implications in a simple, intuitive way. As we discuss in Section 2.2.1, however,
our results do not hinge on the inalienability assumption.
2.1 Analysis
The economy has two dates, 0 and 1. At time 0, the ￿rm has access to a production technology
f(I) that generates output (at time 1) from physical investment I. f(I) satis￿es standard functional
assumptions, but production only occurs if the entrepreneur inputs her human capital. By this we
mean that if the entrepreneur abandons the project, only the physical investment I is left in the ￿rm.
We assume that some amount of external ￿nancing, B, may be needed to initiate the project. Since
human capital is inalienable, the entrepreneur cannot credibly commit her input to the production
process. It is common knowledge that she may renege on any contract she signs, forcing renegotiation
at a future date. As shown in Hart and Moore (1994), if creditors have no bargaining power the
contractual outcome in this framework is such that they will only lend up to the expected value of
the ￿rm in liquidation. This amount of credit can be sustained by a promised payment equal to the
4value of physical investment goods under creditors￿control and a covenant establishing a transfer of
ownership to creditors in states when the entrepreneur does not make the payment.
Let the physical goods invested by the ￿rm have a price equal to 1, which is constant across
time. We model the pledgeability of the ￿rm￿ s assets by assuming that liquidation of those assets by
creditors entails ￿rm-speci￿c transaction costs that are proportional to the value of the assets. More
precisely, if a ￿rm￿ s physical assets are seized by its creditors at time 1, only a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of I
can be recovered. ￿ is a natural function of the tangibility of the ￿rm￿ s physical assets and of other
factors, such as the legal environment that dictates the relations between borrowers and creditors.3
Firms with high ￿ are able to borrow more because they invest in assets whose value can be largely
recaptured by creditors in liquidation states.
Creditors￿valuation of assets in liquidation, ￿I, will establish the ￿rm￿ s borrowing constraint:
B ￿ ￿I; (1)
where B is the amount of new debt that is supported by the project. Besides the new investment op-
portunity, we suppose that the ￿rm also has an amount W of internal funds available for investment.
The entrepreneur maximizes the value of new investment I. Assuming that the discount rate is
equal to zero, the entrepreneur￿ s program can be written as:
max
I
f(I) ￿ I, s:t: (2)
I ￿ W + ￿I: (3)
The ￿rst-best level of investment, IFB, is such that f
0
(IFB) = 1. If the constraint in (3) is satis￿ed
at IFB, the ￿rm is ￿nancially unconstrained. Thus, investment is constrained (i.e., I￿ < IFB) when







Notice that 0 ￿ ￿￿(W;IFB) ￿ 1, and that if IFB￿W < 0 the ￿rm is unconstrained irrespective of the
level of ￿ (hence ￿￿ = 0). If the ￿rm is constrained, the level of investment is determined by the ￿rm￿ s




; if ￿ < ￿￿(W;IFB)
(5)
= IFB; if ￿ ￿ ￿￿(W;IFB):
3Myers and Rajan (1998) parameterize the liquidity of a ￿rm￿ s assets in a similar way.






; if ￿ < ￿￿(W;IFB)
(6)
= 0; if ￿ ￿ ￿￿(W;IFB):
Eq. (6) shows that the investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivity is non-monotonic in the tangibility of
the ￿rm￿ s assets. To be precise, the investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivity increases with the tangibility of
investment when the ￿rm is ￿nancially constrained (that is @2I
@W@￿ > 0, if ￿ < ￿￿(W;IFB)). However, if
tangibility is high enough (￿ ￿ ￿￿(W;IFB)), investment becomes insensitive to changes in cash ￿ ows.
The intuition for the positive relationship between tangibility and investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitiv-
ities for constrained ￿rms resembles that of the credit multiplier of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). To
wit, consider the e⁄ect of a positive cash ￿ ow shock that increases W for two constrained ￿rms with
di⁄erent levels of tangibility, ￿. The change in the availability of internal funds, ￿W, has a direct
e⁄ect on constrained investment, which is the same for both ￿rms (equal to ￿W). However, there
is also an indirect e⁄ect that stems from the endogenous change in borrowing capacity (i.e., a relax-
ation in the credit constraint). This latter e⁄ect, which is equal to ￿￿I, implies that the increase in
borrowing capacity will be greater for the high ￿ ￿rm. In other words, asset tangibility will amplify
the e⁄ect of exogenous income shocks on the investment spending of ￿nancially constrained ￿rms.
Naturally, if the ￿rm￿ s borrowing capacity is high enough, the ￿rm becomes unconstrained and the
investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivity drops to zero. This implies that further changes in tangibility will
have no impact on the investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivity of a ￿rm that is ￿nancially unconstrained.
We state these results in a proposition that motivates our empirical strategy:
Proposition 1 The cash ￿ow sensitivity of investment, @I
@W , bears the following relationship with
asset tangibility:
i) At low levels of tangibility (￿ < ￿￿(W;IFB)), the ￿rm is ￿nancially constrained and
@I
@W increases in asset tangibility,
ii) At high levels of tangibility (￿ ￿ ￿￿(W;IFB)), the ￿rm is ￿nancially unconstrained and
@I
@W is independent of asset tangibility:
Whether the ￿rm is ￿nancially constrained depends not only on asset tangibility, but also on
other variables that a⁄ect the likelihood that the ￿rm will be able to undertake all of its investment
opportunities. In the model, these variables are subsumed in the cut-o⁄ ￿￿(W;IFB). If ￿￿ is high,
the ￿rm is more likely to be ￿nancially constrained. The simple model we analyze suggests that ￿￿
6is increasing in the ￿rm￿ s investment opportunities (IFB), and decreasing in the ￿rm￿ s availability of
funds for investment (W). More generally, however, ￿￿ should be a function of other variables that
a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s external ￿nancing premium. Accordingly, the empirical analysis considers not only
the variables used in the model above, but also other variables that prior literature has identi￿ed as
being indicative of ￿nancing frictions.
2.2 Discussion
Before we move on to the empirical analysis, we discuss a few issues related to our theory.
2.2.1 Inalienability of human capital and creditor bargaining power
We used Hart and Moore￿ s (1994) inalienability of human capital assumption to derive our main
proposition. A natural question is: What elements of the Hart and Moore framework are strictly
necessary for our results to hold?
The crucial element of our theory is that the capacity for external ￿nance generated by new in-
vestments is a positive function of the tangibility of the ￿rm￿ s assets (the credit multiplier). The Hart
and Moore (1994) setup is a convenient way to generate a relationship between debt capacity and
tangibility, but it is not the only way to get at the credit multiplier. We could have just as well argued
that asset tangibility reduces asymmetric information problems because tangible assets￿payo⁄s are
easier to observe. Bernanke et al. (1996) explore yet another rationale (namely, agency problems) in
their version of the credit multiplier. Finally, in an earlier version of the model we use Holmstrom
and Tirole￿ s (1997) theory of moral hazard in project choice to derive similar implications.
We also assumed that creditors have no bargaining power when renegotiating debt repayments
with entrepreneurs. In this way, speci￿ed payments cannot exceed liquidation (collateral) values,
which is the creditor￿ s outside option. A similar link between collateral values and debt capacity is
assumed in the related papers of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), who
in addition show that the link between debt capacity and collateral does not go away when creditors
have positive bargaining power.
2.2.2 Quantity versus cost constraints
In Section 2.1 we assumed a quantity constraint on external funds: ￿rms can raise external ￿nance
up to the value of collateralized debt, and they cannot raise additional external funds irrespective
of how much they would be willing to pay. We note, however, that there will be a multiplier e⁄ect
even if ￿rms can raise external ￿nance beyond the limit implied by the quantity constraint. The key
condition that is required for the multiplier to remain operative is that raising external funds beyond
this limit entails a deadweight cost of external ￿nance (in addition to the fair cost of raising funds). A
7reasonable assumption supporting this story is that the marginal deadweight cost of external funds is
increasing in the amount of uncollateralized ￿nance that the ￿rm is raising (as in Froot et al. (1993)
and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)).
Under the deadweight cost condition, the relation between tangibility and the multiplier arises
from the simple observation that having more collateral reduces the cost premium associated with
external funds. If tangibility is high, a given increase in investment has a lower e⁄ect on the mar-
ginal cost of total (i.e., collateralized and uncollateralized) external ￿nance because it creates higher
collateralized debt capacity. If tangibility is low, on the other hand, then the cost of borrowing in-
creases very rapidly, as the ￿rm has to tap more expensive sources of ￿nance in order to fund the new
investment. Because increases in ￿nancing costs dampen the e⁄ect of a cash ￿ ow shock, investment
will tend to respond more to a cash ￿ ow shock when the tangibility of the underlying assets is high
(a detailed derivation is available from the authors).
3 Empirical Tests
To implement a test of Proposition 1, we need to specify an empirical model relating investment with
cash ￿ ows and asset pledgeability. We will tackle this issue shortly. First we describe our data.
3.1 Data Selection
Our sample selection approach is roughly similar to that of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and
Almeida et al. (2004). We consider the universe of manufacturing ￿rms (SICs 2000￿ 3999) over
the 1985￿ 2000 period with data available from COMPUSTAT￿ s P/S/T and Research tapes on to-
tal assets, market capitalization, capital expenditures, cash ￿ ow, and plant property and equipment
(capital stock). We eliminate ￿rm-years for which the value of capital stock is less than $5 million,
those displaying real asset or sales growth exceeding 100%, and those with negative Q or with Q in
excess of 10. The ￿rst selection rule eliminates very small ￿rms from the sample, for which linear
investment models are likely inadequate (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg). The second rule eliminates
those ￿rm-years registering large jumps in business fundamentals (size and sales); these are typically
indicative of mergers, reorganizations, and other major corporate events. The third data cut-o⁄ is
introduced as a ￿rst, crude attempt to address problems in the measurement of investment opportu-
nities in the raw data and in order to improve the ￿tness of our investment demand model ￿ Abel
and Eberly (2001), among others, discuss the poor empirical ￿t of linear investment equations at
high levels of Q.4 We de￿ ate all series to 1985 dollars using the CPI.
4These same cut-o⁄s for Q are used by Gilchrist and Himmelberg and we ￿nd that their adoption reduces the
average Q in our sample to about 1.0; only slightly lower than studies that use our same data sources and de￿nitions
but that do not impose bounds on the empirical distribution of Q (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) report an average Q
8Many studies in the literature use relatively short data panels and require ￿rms to provide obser-
vations during the entire period under investigation (e.g., Whited (1992), Himmelberg and Petersen
(1994), and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)). While there are advantages to this attrition rule in
terms of series consistency and stability of the data process, imposing it to our 16-year-long sample
would lead to obvious concerns with survivorship biases. We instead require that ￿rms only enter our
sample if they appear for at least three consecutive years in the data (this is the minimum number of
years required for ￿rms to enter our base regression models). Our sample consists of 18,304 ￿rm-years.
3.2 An Empirical Model of Investment, Cash Flow, and Asset Tangibility
3.2.1 Speci￿cation
We experiment with a parsimonious model of investment demand, augmenting the traditional in-
vestment equation with a proxy for asset tangibility and an interaction term that allows the e⁄ect
of cash ￿ ows to vary with asset tangibility. De￿ne Investment as the ratio of capital expenditures
(COMPUSTAT item #128) to beginning-of-period capital stock (lagged item #8). Q is our basic
proxy for investment opportunities, computed as the market value of assets divided by the book
value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24 ￿ item #25) ￿ item #60 ￿ item #74) / (item #6).
CashFlow is earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation (item #18 + item #14) divided
by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Our empirical model is written as:
Investmenti;t = ￿1Qi;t￿1 + ￿2CashFlowi;t + ￿3Tangibilityi;t (7)







where ￿rm and year capture ￿rm- and year-speci￿c e⁄ects, respectively. As we explain in detail
below, our model estimation strategy allows the coe¢ cient vector ￿ to vary with the degree to which
the ￿rm faces ￿nancial constraints.
We refer to Eq. (7) as our ￿baseline speci￿cation.￿According to our theory, the extent to which
internal funds matter for constrained investment should be an increasing function of asset tangibility.
While Eq. (7) is a direct linear measure of the in￿ uence of tangibility on investment￿ cash ￿ ow
sensitivities, note that its interactive form makes the interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients less
obvious. In particular, if one wants to assess the partial e⁄ect of cash ￿ ow on investment, one has to
read o⁄ the result from ￿2 + ￿4 ￿ Tangibility. Hence, in contrast to other papers in the literature,
the estimate returned for ￿2 alone says little about the impact of cash ￿ ow on investment. That
coe¢ cient represents the impact of cash ￿ ow when tangibility equals zero, a point that lies outside of
the empirical distribution of our basic measure of asset tangibility. The summary statistics reported
in Table 1 below will aid in the interpretation of our estimates.
of 1.2, while Polk and Sapienza (2004) report 1.6).
93.2.2 Model Estimation
To test our theory, we need to identify ￿nancially constrained and unconstrained ￿rms. Following
the work of Fazzari et al. (1988), the standard approach in the literature is to use exogenous, a priori
sorting conditions that are hypothesized to be associated with the extent of ￿nancing frictions that
￿rms face (see Erickson and Whited (2000), Almeida et al., (2004), and Hennessy and Whited (2005)
for recent examples of this strategy). After ￿rms are sorted into constrained and unconstrained
groups, Eq. (7) could be separately estimated across those di⁄erent categories.
One of the central predictions of our theory, however, is that the ￿nancial constraint status is
endogenously related to the tangibility of the ￿rm￿ s assets. Hence, we need an estimator that incor-
porates the e⁄ect of tangibility both on cash ￿ ow sensitivities and on the constraint status. To allow
for this e⁄ect, we follow Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and Hovakimian and Titman (2004) and use a
switching regression model with unknown sample separation to estimate our investment regressions.
This model allows the probability of being ￿nancially constrained to depend on asset tangibility
and on standard variables used in the literature (e.g., ￿rm size, age, and growth opportunities). As
explained next, the model simultaneously estimates the equations that predict the constraint status
and the investment spending of constrained and unconstrained ￿rms.
Our analysis takes the switching regression model as the baseline estimation procedure. However,
for ease of replicability, and to aid in the comparability of our results with those in the previous liter-
ature, we also use the more traditional a priori constraint classi￿cation approach to test our story.5
The switching regression model (endogenous constraint selection) Hu and Schiantarelli
(1998) and Hovakimian and Titman (2004) provide a detailed description of the switching regression
estimator. Our approach follows theirs very closely, with the only di⁄erence being the use of asset
tangibility as a predictor of ￿nancial constraints. Here we give a brief summary of the methodology.
Assume that there are two di⁄erent investment regimes, which we denote by ￿regime 1￿ and
￿regime 2.￿ While we take the number of investment regimes as given, the points of structural
change are not observable and are estimated together with the investment equation for each one of
the regimes. The model is composed of the following system of equations (estimated simultaneously):
I1it = Xit￿1 + "1it (8)
I2it = Xit￿2 + "2it (9)
y￿
it = Zit￿ + uit: (10)
5An advantage of using the traditional approach is that some of our robustness tests can only be performed in this
simpler setting, notably the use of measurement-error consistent GMM estimators that we describe in Section 3.5.
10Eqs. (8) and (9) are the structural equations of the system; they are essentially two di⁄erent versions
of our baseline Eq. (7). We compress the notation for brevity, and let Xit = (Qi;t￿1, CashFlowi;t,
Tangibilityi;t, (CashFlow￿Tangibility)i;t) be the vector of exogenous variables, and ￿ be the vector
of coe¢ cients that relates the exogenous variables in X to investment ratios I1it and I2it. Di⁄erential
investment behavior across ￿rms in regime 1 and regime 2 will be captured by di⁄erences between
￿1 and ￿2.
Eq. (10) is the selection equation that establishes the ￿rm￿ s likelihood of being in regime 1 or
regime 2. The vector Zit contains the determinants of a ￿rm￿ s propensity of being in either regime.
Observed investment is given by:
Iit = I1it if y￿
it < 0 (11)
Iit = I2it if y￿
it ￿ 0;
where y￿
it is a latent variable that gauges the likelihood that the ￿rm is in the ￿rst or the second regime.
The parameters ￿1, ￿2, and ￿ are estimated via maximum likelihood. In order to estimate those
parameters it is assumed that the error terms "1, "2, and u are jointly normally distributed, with
a covariance matrix that allows for nonzero correlation between the shocks to investment and the
shocks to ￿rms￿characteristics.6 The extent to which investment spending di⁄ers across the two
regimes and the likelihood that ￿rms are assigned to either regime are simultaneously determined.
The approach yields separate regime-speci￿c estimates for investment equations, dispensing with the
need to use ex-ante regime sortings.
We note that in order to fully identify the switching regression model we need to determine which
regime is the constrained one and which regime is the unconstrained. The algorithm speci￿ed in
Eqs. (8)￿ (11) creates two groups of ￿rms that di⁄er according to their investment behavior, but it
does not automatically tell the econometrician which ￿rms are constrained. To achieve identi￿cation,
we need to use our theoretical priors about which ￿rm characteristics are associated with ￿nancial
constraints. As we will see below, this assignment turns out to be unambiguous in our data.
One advantage of our approach is that it allows us to use multiple variables to predict whether
￿rms are constrained or unconstrained in the selection equation (Eq. (10)). In contrast, the tradi-
tional method of splitting the sample according to a priori characteristics is typically implemented
using one characteristic at a time. In particular, the estimation of the selection equation allows us to
assess the statistical signi￿cance of a given factor assumed to proxy for ￿nancing constraints, while
controlling for the information contained in other factors. Of course, one question is which variables







5, where var(u) is normalized to 1. See Maddala
(1986), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), and Hovakimian and Titman (2004) for additional details.
11should be used in the selection vector Z. Here, we follow the existing literature but add to the set
of variables included in Z the main driver of our credit multiplier story: asset tangibility.
The set of selection variables that we consider comes directly from Hovakimian and Titman
(2004).7 Those variables seem to naturally capture di⁄erent ways in which ￿nancing frictions may be
manifested. The set includes a ￿rm￿ s size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets) and a ￿rm￿ s
age (proxied by the natural logarithm of the number of years the ￿rm appears in the COMPUSTAT
tapes since 1971). We label these variables LogBookAssets and LogAge, respectively. The other
variables are constructed as follows. DummyDivPayout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ￿rm
has made any cash dividend payments in the year. ShortTermDebt is the ratio of short-term debt
(item #34) to total assets. LongTermDebt is the ratio of long-term debt (item #9) to total assets.
GrowthOpportunities is the ratio of market to book value of assets. DummyBondRating is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the ￿rm has a bond rating assigned by Standard & Poors. FinancialSlack is
the ratio of cash and liquid securities to lagged assets. Finally, we include Tangibility in this set (see
de￿nitions in Section 3.2.3). All these variables are entered in the selection equation in lagged form.8
The standard regression model (ex-ante constraint selection) The standard empirical ap-
proach uses ex-ante ￿nancial constraint sortings and least square regressions of investment equations,
where estimations are performed separately for each constraint regime. We also use this approach in
our tests of the multiplier e⁄ect, implementing the sortings schemes discussed in Almeida et al. (2004):
￿ Scheme #1: In every year over the 1985￿ 2000 period we rank ￿rms based on their payout ratio
and assign to the ￿nancially constrained (unconstrained) group those ￿rms in the bottom (top)
three deciles of the annual payout distribution. We compute the payout ratio as the ratio of total
distributions (dividends plus stock repurchases) to operating income. The intuition that ￿nan-
cially constrained ￿rms have signi￿cantly lower payout ratios follows from Fazzari et al. (1988).
￿ Scheme #2: In every year over the 1985￿ 2000 period we rank ￿rms based on their total as-
sets and assign to the ￿nancially constrained (unconstrained) group those ￿rms in the bottom
(top) three deciles of the annual asset size distribution. This approach resembles Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited (2000), among others.
￿ Scheme #3: In every year over the 1985￿ 2000 period we retrieve data on bond ratings assigned
by Standard & Poors and categorize those ￿rms with debt outstanding but without a bond
7The set of variables used in Hu and Schiantarelli (1997) resembles that of Hovakimian and Titman, but is more
parsimonious. The results we obtain with the use of this alternative set is omitted from the paper, but are similar to
what we report below.
8In a previous version of the paper, we also used a second set of selection variables that closely resemble those used
in the ex-ante selection model below. The results are virtually identical to those reported in Table 3 and are omitted
for space considerations.
12rating as ￿nancially constrained. Financially unconstrained ￿rms are those whose bonds are
rated. Similar approaches are used by, e.g., Kashyap et al. (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), and Cummins et al. (1999).
￿ Scheme #4: In every year over the 1985￿ 2000 period we retrieve data on commercial paper
ratings assigned by Standard & Poors and categorize those ￿rms with debt outstanding but
without a commercial paper rating as ￿nancially constrained. Financially unconstrained ￿rms
are those whose commercial papers are rated. This approach follows from the work of Calomiris
et al. (1995) on the characteristics of commercial paper issuers.
3.2.3 Tangibility measures
Asset tangibility (Tangibility) is measured in three alternative ways. The ￿rst approach we take is
to construct a ￿rm-level measure of expected asset liquidation values that borrows from Berger et al.
(1996). In determining whether investors rationally value their ￿rms￿abandonment option, Berger et
al. gather data on the proceeds from discontinued operations reported by a sample of COMPUSTAT
￿rms over the 1984￿ 1993 period. The authors ￿nd that a dollar of book value yields, on average, 72
cents in exit value for total receivables, 55 cents for inventory, and 54 cents for ￿xed assets. Following
their study, we estimate liquidation values for the ￿rm-years in our sample via the computation:
Tangibility = 0:715 ￿ Receivables + 0:547 ￿ Inventory + 0:535 ￿ Capital;
where Receivables is COMPUSTAT item #2, Inventory is item #3, and Capital is item #8. As in
Berger et al., we add the value of cash holdings (item #1) to this measure and scale the result by
total book assets. Although we believe that the nature of the ￿rm production process will largely
determine the ￿rm￿ s asset allocation across ￿xed capital, inventories, etc., there could be some degree
of endogeneity in this measure of tangibility. In particular, one could argue that whether a ￿rm is
constrained might a⁄ect its investments in more tangible assets and thus its credit capacity. The
argument for an endogenous bias in our tests along these lines, nonetheless, becomes a very unlikely
proposition when we use either one of the next two measures of tangibility.
The second measure of tangibility we use is a time-variant, industry-level proxy that gauges the
ease with which lenders can liquidate a ￿rm￿ s productive capital. Following Kessides (1990) and
Worthington (1995), we measure asset redeployability using the ratio of used to total (i.e., used plus
new) ￿xed depreciable capital expenditures in an industry. The idea that the degree of activity in
asset resale markets ￿ i.e., demand for second-hand capital ￿ will in￿ uence ￿nancial contractibility
along the lines we explore here was ￿rst proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992). To construct the
intended measure, we hand-collect data for used and new capital acquisitions at the four-digit SIC
13level from the Bureau of Census￿Economic Census. These data are compiled by the Bureau once
every ￿ve years. We match our COMPUSTAT data set with the Census series using the most timely
information on the industry ratio of used to total capital expenditures for every ￿rm-year throughout
our sample period.9 Estimations based on this measure of tangibility use smaller sample sizes since
not all of COMPUSTAT￿ s SIC codes are covered by the Census and recent Census surveys omit the
new/used capital purchase breakdown.
The third measure of tangibility we consider is related to the proxy just discussed in that it also
gauges creditors￿ability to readily dispose of a ￿rm￿ s assets. Based on the well-documented high
cyclicality of durables goods industry sales, we use a durable/nondurable industry dichotomy that
relates asset illiquidity to operations in the durables sector. This proxy is also in the spirit of Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), who emphasize the decline in collateralized borrowing in circumstances in which
assets in receivership will not be assigned to ￿rst-best alternative users: other ￿rms in the same
industry. To wit, because durables goods producers are highly cycle-sensitive, negative shocks to
demand will likely a⁄ect all best alternative users of a durables producer￿ s assets, decreasing tangi-
bility. Our implementation follows the work of Sharpe (1994), who groups industries according to the
historical covariance between their sales and the GNP. The set of high covariance industries includes
all of the durable goods industries (except SICs 32 and 38) plus SIC 30. We refer to these industries
as ￿durables,￿and label the remaining industries ￿nondurables.￿We conjecture that the assets of
￿rms operating in nondurables (durables) industries are perceived as more (less) liquid by lenders,
and assign to ￿rms in these industries the value of 1 (0).
Tangibility of new versus existing assets One potential caveat is that, strictly speaking, Propo-
sition 1 refers to variations in the tangibility of new investments. The three measures that we use,
however, refer to the tangibility of assets in place. If the assets that are acquired with the new
investment are of a similar nature to those that are already in place, then the distinction between
tangibility of new and existing assets is unimportant for most practical purposes. In this case, our
measures will be good proxies for the tangibility of new investment. We believe this is a reasonable
assumption for a very large portion of observed capital expenditures in our data, specially given that
we restrict our sample to manufacturing ￿rms, and discard from our sample those ￿rms that display
large jumps in business fundamentals (size and sales). These data ￿lters allow us to focus on ￿rms
whose demand for capital investment follow a more predictable/standard expansion path.
Unfortunately, data limitations preclude us from providing direct evidence for the conjecture that
the tangibility of assets in place is a good proxy for the tangibility of new investment. In particular,
9E.g., we use the 1987 Census to gauge the asset redeployability of COMPUSTAT ￿rms with ￿scal years in the
1985￿ 1989 window.
14we don￿ t have detailed information on the types of physical assets that are acquired with the marginal
dollar of investment. We note, however, that if the tangibility of the existing assets is a poor proxy
for the tangibility of marginal investments, then our tests should lack the power to identify the credit
multiplier e⁄ect. Later in the analysis (Section 3.6), we go a step further and experiment with this
idea to provide an indirect challenge to this scale-enhancing assumption.
3.2.4 The use of Q in investment demand equations
One issue to consider is whether the presence of Q in our regressions will bias the inferences that we
can make about the impact of cash ￿ ows on investment spending. Such concerns have become a topic
of debate in the literature, as evidence of higher investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities for constrained
￿rms has been ascribed to measurement and interpretation problems with regressions including Q
(see Cummins et al. (1999), Erickson and Whited (2000), Gomes (2001), and Alti (2003)).
Fortunately, these problems do not have a ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the types of inferences about con-
strained investment that we can make with our tests. The argument in the literature (e.g., Gomes
(2001) and Alti (2003)) is that Q can be a comparatively poorer proxy for investment opportunities
for ￿rms typically classi￿ed as ￿nancially constrained. This proxy quality problem can bias upwards
the level of investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities for ￿rms seen as constrained even in the absence of
￿nancing frictions. Our proposed testing strategy sidesteps this problem because our empirical test
is independent of the level of the estimated cash ￿ ow coe¢ cients of constrained and unconstrained
￿rms. In contrast, it revolves around the marginal e⁄ect of asset tangibility on the impact of income
shocks on spending under credit constraints (the credit multiplier mechanism). In order to argue
that a systematic relationship between tangibility and the bias a› icting the Q coe¢ cient drives our
results, one would have to explain why this systematic relationship a⁄ects ￿rms in the constrained
sample, but has no e⁄ect on ￿rms in the unconstrained sample.
However, cross-sample di⁄erences in measurement biases a⁄ecting Q are not the only source of
problems for tests that rely on standard investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities. In the context of the
Fazzari et al. (1988) test, for example, Erickson and Whited (2000) have shown that cross-sample
di⁄erences in the variance of cash ￿ ows alone may generate di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow sensitivities across
constrained and unconstrained ￿rms when Q is mismeasured. Since we use Q in our basic estima-
tions, it is possible that similar statistical issues could bias the inferences that we make using the
credit multiplier mechanism.10 We cannot completely rule out the possibility that some property of
the joint statistical distribution of the variables in our analysis, coupled with Q-measurement error,
might introduce estimation biases that are di¢ cult to sign. Because of this potential indeterminacy,
10Taken literally, Erickson and Whited￿ s arguments imply that any regression featuring Q may be subject to biases.
15we also experiment with several techniques that produce reliable sensitivity estimates even when Q is
mismeasured. First, we follow Cummins et al. (1999) and estimate our baseline model using a GMM
estimator that uses ￿nancial analysts￿earnings forecasts as instruments for Q. Second, we use the
measurement error-consistent GMM estimator suggested by Erickson and Whited (2000). Finally, we
estimate Bond and Meghir￿ s (1994) Euler-based empirical model of capital investment; this estimator
entirely dispenses with the need to include Q in the set of regressors.
3.3 Sample Characteristics
Our sample selection criteria and variable construction follow the standard in the ￿nancial constraints
literature. The only exception concerns the central variable of our study: asset tangibility. To save
space, our discussion about basic sample characteristics revolves around that variable. Table 1 re-
ports detailed summary statistics for each of the three measures of asset tangibility we use. The ￿rst
tangibility measure indicates that a ￿rm￿ s assets in liquidation are expected to fetch, on average, 53
cents on the dollar of book value. The second measure indicates that the average industry-level ratio
of used to total (i.e., used plus new) capital acquisitions is 7.4%. The third indicates that 46.4% of
the sample ￿rms operate in the nondurable goods industries.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 reports summary statistics for ￿rm investment, Q, and cash ￿ ows, separately for ￿rms
with high and low tangibility levels. The purpose of this table is to check whether there are distribu-
tional patterns in those three variables that are systematically related with asset tangibility. Our ￿rst
two measures of tangibility are continuous variables and we categorize as ￿low-tangibility￿(￿high-
tangibility￿ ) ￿rms those ￿rms ranked in the bottom (top) three deciles of the tangibility distribution;
these rankings are performed on an annual basis. The third tangibility measure is a dichotomous
variable and we categorize as low-tangibility (high-tangibility) ￿rms those ￿rms in durables (non-
durables) industries. The numbers in Table 2 imply the absence of any systematic patterns for
investment demand, investment opportunities, and cash ￿ ows across low- and high-tangibility ￿rms.
For example, while high-tangibility ￿rms seem to invest more and have higher cash ￿ ows according
to the ￿rst two tangibility proxies, the opposite is true when the third proxy is used.
Table 2 about here
3.4 Results
We ￿rst report and interpret the results from the switching regression model. Then we describe
the results we obtain when we use the standard estimation approach to investment spending across
constrained and unconstrained ￿rms.
163.4.1 Switching regressions
Table 3 presents the results returned from the switching regression estimation of our baseline model
(Eqs. (8)￿ (10)). Panel A contains the results from the structural investment equations for con-
strained and unconstrained ￿rms. In this panel, each of the three rows reports the results associated
with a particular measure of asset tangibility. Panel B contains the results from the constraint selec-
tion equations. In this panel, each of the three columns corresponds to a particular measure of asset
tangibility. In addition, the last row of panel B reports P-values for the test of the null hypothesis
that a single investment regime ￿ as opposed to two regimes (constrained versus unconstrained) ￿
is su¢ cient to describe the data. This test is based on a likelihood ratio statistic for which the ￿2
distribution can be used for statistical inferences (cf. Goldfeld and Quandt (1976)).
A total of 6 investment equations (3 tangibility proxies ￿ 2 constraints categories) are reported,
yielding 3 constrained￿ unconstrained comparison pairs. Since we use interaction terms in all of our
regressions and because the key variable used to gauge interaction e⁄ects (namely, Tangibility) is
de￿ned di⁄erently across our estimations, we carefully discuss the economic meaning of all of the
estimates we report.
Table 3 about here
Firstly, consider the results from the selection equations (Panel B). As it turns out, the results
we obtain are very similar to those of Table 4 in Hovakimian and Titman (we note that the outputs
from the two papers have reversed signs by construction). As in their paper, we ￿nd that companies
that are smaller, that are younger, that pay lower amounts of dividends, that have greater invest-
ment opportunities, that do not have bond ratings, and that carry greater ￿nancial slack are grouped
together into one of the investment regimes (regime 1).11 Our theoretical priors suggest that this is
the group of ￿rms that are most likely to be ￿nancially constrained. We also ￿nd that short- and
long-term ratios have relatively little e⁄ect on the likelihood of being classi￿ed in either group. More
important for our story, note that Tangibility leads to a lower probability of being in regime 1, that
is, a lower probability of facing ￿nancial constraints ￿ its implied e⁄ect is comparable to that of
bond ratings.12 And this result is statistically signi￿cant for each one of our tangibility proxies.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the central ￿ndings of this paper. Based on the results from the
selection model, we call the ￿rms classi￿ed in investment regime 1 (regime 2) ￿constrained￿(￿uncon-
strained￿ ) ￿rms. Notice that each and every one of the regression pairs in the table reveals the same
11Note that the dependent variable in Panel B of Table 3 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the ￿rm is in investment
regime 1, and 0 if the ￿rm is in investment regime 2.
12For illustration, while holding other variables at their unconditional average values, a large (two standard deviation)
increase in Tangibility brings down the probability of being ￿nancially constrained by about as much as the granting
of a bond rating by S&P.
17key result: constrained ￿rms￿investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities are increasing in asset tangibility,
while unconstrained ￿rms￿sensitivities show no or little response (often in the opposite direction)
to tangibility. Indeed, the interaction between cash ￿ ow and tangibility attracts positive, statisti-
cally signi￿cant coe¢ cients in all of the constrained ￿rm estimations. Further, these coe¢ cients are
uniformly higher than those of the unconstrained samples, and statistically di⁄erent at the 1% (al-
ternatively, 5%) test level in all but one (alternatively, all) of the comparison pairs. Because higher
tangibility makes it more likely that a ￿rm will be unconstrained (Panel B), the positive e⁄ect of
tangibility on investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities is most likely to obtain for low levels of tangibil-
ity. These ￿ndings are fully consistent with the presence of a multiplier e⁄ect for constrained ￿rm
investment that works along the lines of our model.
It is important to illustrate the impact of asset tangibility on the sensitivity of investment to cash
￿ ows when the ￿rm is ￿nancially constrained (the credit multiplier e⁄ect). To do so, we consider
the estimates associated with our baseline measure of tangibility (￿rst row of Panel A in Table 3).
Notice that when calculated at the ￿rst quartile of Tangibility (i.e., at 0:32, see Table 1), the partial
e⁄ect of a one-standard-deviation cash ￿ ow innovation (which is equal to 0:67) on investment per
dollar of capital is approximately 0:09. In contrast, at the third quartile of the same measure (i.e., at
0:69), that partial e⁄ect exceeds 0:20.13 To highlight the importance of these estimates we note that
the mean investment-to-capital ratio in our sample is 0:24. Analogous calculations for unconstrained
￿rms yield mostly economically and statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ects regarding the e⁄ect of asset
tangibility. Because we are not strictly estimating structural investment equations, these economic
magnitudes should be interpreted with some caution. Yet, they clearly ascribe an important role for
the credit multiplier in shaping the investment behavior of constrained ￿rms.
Notice that the coe¢ cients on CashFlow are negative in row 1 of the table, but positive in the
estimations reported in rows 2 and 3. This sign reversal is due to the impact of the (tangibility-) ￿in-
teraction￿e⁄ect on the ￿main￿regression e⁄ect of cash ￿ ows, coupled with the fact that Tangibility
is a quite di⁄erent regressor across the estimations in rows 1 through 3. Importantly, the estimates
in row 1 do not suggest that positive cash ￿ ow shocks are detrimental to ￿rm investment. To see
this, note that although CashFlow attracts a negative coe¢ cient, in order for cash ￿ ow to hamper
investment, Tangibility should equal zero (or be very close to zero), which as one can infer from Table
1, is a point outside the empirical distribution of that ￿rm-level measure of tangibility.14 Indeed,
when we compute the partial e⁄ect of cash ￿ ows on investment we ￿nd that these e⁄ects are positive
13The partial e⁄ects are equal to the standard deviation of cash ￿ ows times the coe¢ cient on CashFlow, plus that same
standard deviation times the coe¢ cient on the interaction term times the level of Tangibility (￿rst or third quartiles).
14The linear estimator for interactive models will produce vector coe¢ cients for the ￿main￿e⁄ects of the interacted
variables even when those e⁄ects accrue to data points that lie outside of the actual sample distribution. The minimum
observation in the distribution of our baseline measure of tangibility is 0.11.
18even at very low levels of tangibility. On the other hand, Tangibility is often either very small or
exactly zero when the industry-level measures of asset tangibility are used in the estimations (rows 2
and 3). In those estimations, CashFlow returns a positive signi￿cant coe¢ cient, also consistent with
the idea that cash ￿ ow and investment are positively correlated, even when tangibility is low.
The remaining estimates in Panel A of Table 3 display patterns that are also consistent with
our story and with previous research. For instance, the coe¢ cients returned for Q are in the same
range of those reported by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Polk and Sapienza (2004), among
other comparable studies. Those coe¢ cients tend to be somewhat larger for the constrained ￿rms,
a pattern also seen in some of the estimations in Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), and
Cummins et al. (1999). The coe¢ cients returned for Tangibility are positive in our estimations,
although statistically insigni￿cant.
3.4.2 Standard regressions
Table 4 presents the results returned from the estimation of our baseline regression model for a priori
determined sample partitions and for each of our three tangibility proxies. Here, Eq. (7) is estimated
via OLS with ￿rm- and year-￿xed e⁄ects,15 and the error structure (estimated via Huber-White)
allows for residual heteroskedasticity and time clustering. A total of 8 estimated equations (4 con-
straints criteria ￿ 2 constraints categories) are reported in each of the 3 panels in the table, yielding
12 constrained￿ unconstrained comparison pairs.
Table 4 about here
As in our previous estimations, notice that each one of the regression pairs in the table show
that constrained ￿rms￿investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities are increasing in asset tangibility, while un-
constrained ￿rms￿sensitivities show little or no response to tangibility. Once again, the interaction
between cash ￿ ow and tangibility attracts positive, statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in all of the con-
strained ￿rm estimations. And these coe¢ cients are uniformly higher than those of the unconstrained
samples: constrained￿ unconstrained coe¢ cient di⁄erences are signi￿cant at the 1% test level in 10 of
the 12 pairs. The results we obtain through this estimation approach are also fully consistent with the
presence of the credit multiplier e⁄ect our theory describes. They are of special interest in that they
are very closely related to the types of tests implemented in the vast literature on ￿nancial constraints.
3.5 Robustness
We subject our ￿ndings to a number of robustness checks in order to address potential concerns with
empirical biases in our estimations. These additional checks involve, among others, changes to our
15The only exception applies to the results in the last panel (durables/nondurables dichotomy), where including
￿rm-￿xed e⁄ects is unfeasible since ￿rms are assigned to only one (time-invariant) industry category.
19baseline speci￿cation (including the use of alternative lagging schemes), changes to proxy construc-
tion and instrumentation, subsampling checks, and outlier treatment (e.g., winsorizing at extreme
quantiles). These tests produce no qualitative changes to our empirical ￿ndings and are omitted
from the paper for space considerations. In contrast, we report here a number of less standard, more
sophisticated checks of the reliability of our ￿ndings. These tests build on the traditional constraint
classi￿cation approach, for which previous research has developed alternative procedures meant to
verify estimation robustness. It is worth pointing out that checks of the types we describe below have
been used to dismiss the inferences one achieves based on estimates of investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensi-
tivities. We report the results from these checks in Table 5, where for conciseness, we only present
the estimates returned for the interaction term CashFlow ￿ Tangibility ￿ this term captures our
credit multiplier e⁄ect. For ease of exposition, we focus our discussion on the results associated with
our baseline proxy for asset tangibility.
The primary concern we want to address is the issue of measurement errors in our proxy for invest-
ment opportunities, Q. We investigate the possibility that mismeasurement in Q may a⁄ect our infer-
ences by using the estimators of three papers that tackle this empirical issue: Cummins et al. (1999),
Erickson and Whited (2000), and Bond and Meghir (1994). Results from these GMM estimators (in-
cluding the associated Hansen￿ s J-statistics for overidenti￿cation restrictions) are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 about here
In the ￿rst row of Table 5, we follow the work of Cummins et al. (1999) and use ￿nancial analysts￿
forecasts of earnings as an instrument for Q in a GMM estimation of our investment model. As in
Almeida et al. (2004), we employ the median forecast of the two-year ahead earnings scaled by lagged
total assets to construct the earnings forecast measure. The set of instruments in these estimations
also includes lags 2 through 4 of ￿rm investment and cash ￿ ows. Although only some 80% of the ￿rm-
years in our original sample provide valid observations for earnings forecasts, our basic results remain.
The second row of Table 5 displays the interaction term coe¢ cients we obtain from the estimator
labeled GMM5 in Erickson and Whited (2000); this uses higher-order moment conditions for identi-
￿cation (as opposed to conditional mean restrictions).16 One di¢ culty we ￿nd in implementing the
estimator proposed by Erickson and Whited is isolating observations that are suitable for their pro-
cedure. We can only isolate windows of three consecutive years of data after subjecting our sample
to those authors￿data ￿pre-tests,￿and these windows cover di⁄erent stretches of our sample period.
Moreover, the use of their procedure fails to return estimates for the constraint characterizations
that are based on payout ratios and bond ratings.17 In spite of these limitations, we ￿nd that our
16We implement the GAUSS codes made available by Toni Whited in her Webpage.
17Erickson and Whited, too, report these sampling di¢ culties in their paper; their sample is constrained to a
20previous inferences continue to hold for each of the remaining constraint criteria. These ￿ndings are
reassuring in that they suggest that mismeasurement in empirical Q does not seem to translate into
biased inferences about the credit multiplier e⁄ect of asset tangibility.
In row 3, we experiment with the Euler-type investment model proposed by Bond and Meghir
(1994), by adding the lag of investment, its square, the lagged ratio of sales to capital, and the
squared, lagged debt-to-capital ratio to the set of regressors. In estimating this lagged dependent
variable model, we use the two-step dynamic panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991), where di⁄erenced regressors are instrumented by their lagged levels. A noticeable feature of
this empirical model is the absence of Q from the set of regressors ￿ estimates are free from issues
concerning mismeasurement in Q. Results in row 3 show that our conclusions about the multiplier
e⁄ect on constrained investment continue to hold.
3.6 Di⁄erent Types of Investment: Fixed Capital versus R&D Expenditures
Our analysis has implicitly assumed that the tangibility of existing assets is a good proxy for the tan-
gibility of marginal investments (see Section 3.2.3). In this section, we revisit our proxy assumption
based on an indirect line of reasoning. To wit, we challenge our data assumptions and experiment
with the idea that if the tangibility of the existing assets is a poor proxy for the tangibility of marginal
investments, then our tests should lack the power to identify the credit multiplier e⁄ect.
To do so, we gather data on expenditures that do not obey the scale-enhancing restriction. R&D
expenditures constitute a good example. Irrespective of the tangibility of the ￿rm￿ s assets, marginal
R&D investments should be associated with very low tangibility (if any). Di⁄erently from capital
expenditures, investments in intangible assets do not generate additional debt capacity, and thus
should not yield a multiplier e⁄ect. Our theory would then suggest that we should not ￿nd a credit
multiplier e⁄ect if we estimate the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of R&D expenditures. While con￿rming this
conjecture is not a direct proof that our scale-enhancing hypothesis is correct for capital expenditures,
it provides evidence that if our hypothesis was incorrect (i.e., that if we used very poor proxies for
marginal tangibility) we would not have found the results that we report.
To specify a test that isolates the multiplier e⁄ect associated with R&D investments, we must ad-
dress the following complication. Because a cash ￿ ow innovation will translate into variations in both
R&D and ￿xed capital expenditures for a constrained ￿rm (see Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)), it is
possible that the ampli￿cation e⁄ect that stems from regular capital expenditures will correlate with
spending in R&D. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of R&D investment
four-year window containing only 737 ￿rms. Di⁄erently from their paper, our speci￿cation features a proxy for
tangibility and a cash ￿ ow￿ tangibility interaction term. This complicates our search for a stretch of data that passes
their estimator￿ s pre-tests. We could only ￿nd suitable samples of both ￿nancially constrained and unconstrained ￿rms
by size and commercial paper ratings over the 1996￿ 1998 and 1992￿ 1994 periods, respectively.
21is uncorrelated with tangibility in the data, even when R&D adds nothing to a ￿rm￿ s credit capacity.
This argument suggests that in order to isolate the R&D multiplier, we have to control for the
level of endogenous capital expenditures in the R&D regression. Because the e⁄ect of (￿xed capital)
tangibility on R&D is transmitted through a variation in capital expenditures, the cash ￿ ow sensi-
tivity of R&D expenditures should then be independent of asset tangibility. One way to perform this
estimation is to use a two-stage least squares procedure, whereby we estimate the ￿rm￿ s expected
￿xed investment in the ￿rst stage as a function of all of the exogenous parameters, and then include
the predicted values from this equation in a second-stage equation where we relate R&D spending
to cash ￿ ows and endogenous ￿xed investment.
This proposed strategy can be readily implemented within our framework by ￿tting our baseline
investment equation (Eq. (7)) to the data in order to generate predicted ￿xed capital investment
values (denoted by b I) and then estimating the following model:
IR&Di;t = ￿1b Ii;t + ￿2CashFlowi;t + ￿3Tangibilityi;t (12)







Notice that we do not need to include proxies for investment opportunities in the set of regressors in
Eq. (12), because the e⁄ect of investment opportunities is also subsumed in the relationship between
IR&D and b I. This insight in turn allows us to use lagged Q to identify the model.18 Our hypothesis is
that the e⁄ect of cash ￿ ow on R&D investment is independent of tangibility, even for constrained ￿rms.
Table 6 reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (12) via switching regressions. Each of
the three rows in the table refers to one of our measures of tangibility, where we report the results
for the structural equations across constrained and unconstrained sample, but omit the output from
the selection equation. Focusing on the estimates of interest, note that while there is indeed a strong
association between R&D and ￿xed capital expenditures, once this association is controlled for, it
is not the case that the sensitivity of R&D expenditures to cash ￿ ow will be increasing in the level
of asset tangibility. In fact, all of the CashFlow ￿ Tangibility interaction terms attract negative
(mostly statistically insigni￿cant) coe¢ cients. These results agree with our conjecture that the use
of poor proxies for marginal tangibility should lead to failure in uncovering the credit multiplier.
Table 6 about here
18We let Q provide the extra vector dimensionality necessary for model identi￿cation because this follows more
naturally from the empirical framework we use throughout the paper. In unreported estimations, however, we
experiment with alternative regressors (e.g., sales growth) and obtain the same results.
224 Concluding Remarks
Despite the theoretical plausibility of a channel linking ￿nancing frictions and real investment, pre-
vious literature has found it di¢ cult to empirically identify this channel. This paper proposes a
novel identi￿cation scheme, which is based on the e⁄ect of asset pledgeability on ￿nancially con-
strained corporate investment. Because our testing strategy does not rely on the absolute levels of
investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities in constrained and unconstrained samples, it is less subject to the
empirical problems that have been associated with the traditional Fazzari et al.￿ s (1988) approach.
Our methodology incorporates Kaplan and Zingales￿ s (1997) suggestion that investment￿ cash ￿ ow
sensitivities need not decrease monotonically with variables that relax ￿nancing constraints. How-
ever, we argue that this non-monotonicity can be used in a positive way, to help uncover information
about ￿nancing constraints that might be embedded in investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities. We be-
lieve that our testing approach will prove useful for future researchers in need of a reliable method
of identifying the impact of ￿nancial constraints on investment and other ￿nancial variables, and
in more general contexts where investment￿ cash ￿ ow sensitivities might help in drawing inferences
about the interplay between capital markets and corporate behavior.
The evidence we uncover in this paper is strongly consistent with a link between ￿nancing frictions
and investment. As we hypothesize, we ￿nd that while asset tangibility increases investment￿ cash
￿ ow sensitivities for ￿nancially constrained ￿rms, no such e⁄ects are observed for unconstrained ￿rms.
Moreover, tangibility in￿ uences a ￿rm￿ s credit status according to theoretical expectations: ￿rms with
more tangible assets are less likely to be ￿nancially constrained. The positive e⁄ect of tangibility
on constrained cash ￿ ow sensitivities is evidence for a credit multiplier in U.S. corporate investment.
Income shocks have especially large e⁄ects for constrained ￿rms with tangible assets, because these
￿rms have highly procyclical debt capacity. This insight can have interesting implications for asset
pricing and macroeconomics, which could be explored by future researchers and policymakers.19
19See Hahn and Lee (2005) for recent evidence that the credit multiplier has implications for the cross-section of
stock returns, Almeida et al. (2005), for evidence that the credit multiplier ampli￿es ￿ uctuations in housing prices and
housing credit demand, and Gan (2004), who examines the interaction between the credit multiplier and the collapse
of Japanese land prices in the 1990￿ s.
23References
Abel, A., and J. Eberly, 2001, ￿Investment and Q with Fixed Costs: An Empirical Analysis,￿
Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Almeida, H., M. Campello, and C. Liu, 2005, ￿Financial Accelerator in Household Spending: Evi-
dence from International Housing Markets,￿Working paper, New York University and Univer-
sity of Illinois.
Almeida, H., M. Campello, and M. Weisbach, 2004, ￿The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash,￿Journal
of Finance 59, 1777-1804.
Alti, A., 2003, ￿How Sensitive is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing is Frictionless?￿Journal
of Finance 58, 707-722.
Arellano, M., and S. Bond, 1991, ￿Some Tests of Speci￿cation for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence
and an Application to Employment Equations,￿Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297.
Berger, P., E. Ofek, and I. Swary, 1996, ￿Investor Valuation and Abandonment Option,￿Journal of
Financial Economics 42, 257-287.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist, 1996, ￿The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to
Quality,￿Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 1-15.
Blanchard, O., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1994, ￿What Do Firms Do with Cash Wind-
falls?￿Journal of Financial Economics 36, 337-360.
Bond, S., and C. Meghir, 1994, ￿Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm￿ s Financial Policy,￿
Review of Economic Studies 61, 197-222.
Calomiris, C., C. Himmelberg, and P. Wachtel, 1995, ￿Commercial Paper and Corporate Finance:
A Microeconomic Perspective,￿ Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45,
203-250.
Calomiris, C., and R. G. Hubbard, 1995, ￿Internal Finance and Firm-Level Investment: Evidence
from the Undistributed Pro￿ts Tax of 1936-37,￿Journal of Business 68, 443-482.
Cleary, S., 1999, ￿The Relationship Between Firm Investment and Financial Status,￿Journal of
Finance 54, 673-92.
Cummins, J., K. Hasset, and S. Oliner, 1999, ￿Investment Behavior, Observable Expectations, and
Internal Funds,￿forthcoming, American Economic Review.
Devereux, M., and F. Schiantarelli, 1990, ￿Investment Financial Factors and Cash Flow: Evidence
from UK Panel Data,￿In: Hubbard, R. G. (Ed.), Asymmetric Information Corporate Finance
and Investment. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 279-306.
Diamond, D. and R. Rajan, 2001, ￿Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A
Theory of Banking,￿Journal of Political Economy 109, 287-327.
Erickson, T., and T. Whited, 2000, ￿Measurement Error and the Relationship between Investment
and Q,￿Journal of Political Economy 108, 1027-1057.
Fazzari S., R. G. Hubbard, and B. Petersen, 1988, ￿Financing Constraints and Corporate Invest-
ment,￿Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1, 141-195.
24Fazzari, S., and B. Petersen, 1993, ￿Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence on
Financing Constrains,￿RAND Journal of Economics 24, 328-342.
Froot, K., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, 1993, ￿Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Invest-
ment and Financing Policies,￿Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658.
Gan, J., 2004, ￿Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment: Evidence from an Exogenous
Shock to Collateral￿ , working paper, HKUST, Hong Kong.
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist, 1994, ￿Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and The Behavior of Small
Manufacturing Firms,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 309-340.
Gertler, M., and R. G. Hubbard, 1988, ￿Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations￿ , in Financial
Market Volatility, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Gertner, R., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, 1994, ￿Internal Versus External Capital Markets,￿Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 109, 1211-1230.
Gilchrist, S., and C. Himmelberg, 1995, ￿Evidence on the Role of Cash Flow for Investment,￿
Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 541-572.
Goldfeld, S. and R. Quandt, 1976, ￿Techniques for Estimating Switching Regressions,￿in Goldfeld
and Quandt (eds.), Studies in Non-Linear Estimation, Cambridge: Ballinger, 3-36.
Gomes, J., 2001, ￿Financing Investment,￿American Economic Review 91, 1263-1285.
Hahn, J. and H. Lee, 2005, ￿Financial Constraints, Debt Capacity, and the Cross Section of Stock
Returns,￿Working paper, University of Washington and Korea Development Institute.
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1994, ￿A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 841-879.
Hennessy, C., and T. Whited, 2005, ￿How Costly is External Financing? Evidence from a Structural
Estimation,￿Working paper, University of Wisconsin.
Himmelberg, C., and B. Petersen, 1994, ￿R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study of Small Firms
in High-Tech Industries,￿Review of Economic and Statistics 76, 38-51.
Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1997, ￿Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sec-
tor,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691.
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, 1991, ￿Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment:
Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 33-60.
Hovakimian, G., and S. Titman, 2004, ￿Corporate Investment with Financial Constraints: Sensi-
tivity of Investment to Funds from Voluntary Asset Sales,￿ forthcoming, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking.
Hubbard, R. G., 1998, ￿Capital Market Imperfections and Investment,￿Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 36, 193-227.
Hu, X., and F. Schiantarelli, 1997, ￿Investment and Capital Market Imperfections: A Switching
Regression Approach Using U.S. Firm Panel Data,￿ Review of Economic and Statistics 79,
466-479.
Hubbard, R. G., Kashyap, A., and Whited, T., 1995, ￿Internal Finance and Firm Investment,￿
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27, 683-701.
25Kadapakkam, P., P. Kumar, and L. Riddick, 1998, ￿The Impact of Cash Flows and Firm Size on
Investment: The International Evidence,￿Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 293-320.
Kaplan, S., and L. Zingales, 1997, ￿Do Financing Constraints Explain why Investment is Correlated
with Cash Flow?￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 169-215.
Kashyap, A., O. Lamont, and J. Stein, 1994,￿Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of In-
ventories,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 565-592.
Kessides, I., 1990, ￿Market Concentration, Contestability, and Sunk Costs,￿Review of Economics
and Statistics 72, 614-622.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore, 1997, ￿Credit Cycles,￿Journal of Political Economy 105, 211-248.
Maddala, G. S., 1986, ￿Disequilibrium, Self-selection, and Switching Models,￿in Griliches, Z. and
M. D. Intriligator (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Vol.3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1633-
1688.
Myers, S., and R. Rajan, 1998, ￿The Paradox of Liquidity,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 113,
733-777.
Polk, C., and P. Sapienza, 2004, ￿The Real E⁄ects of Investor Sentiment,￿Working paper, North-
western University.
Rauh, J., 2006, ￿Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate
Pension Plans,￿Journal of Finance 61, 33-71.
Rosenzweig, M., and K. Wolpin, 2000, ￿Natural ￿ Natural Experiments￿in Economics,￿Journal of
Economic Literature 38, 827-874.
Sharpe, S., 1994, ￿Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage and the Cyclicality of Employ-
ment,￿American Economic Review 84, 1060-1074.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1992, ￿Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium
Approach,￿Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1365.
Stein, J., 1997, ￿Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources,￿Journal
of Finance 52, 111-133.
Whited, T., 1992, ￿Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from Panel
Data,￿Journal of Finance 47, 425-460.
Worthington P., 1995, ￿Investment, Cash Flow, and Sunk Costs,￿Journal of Industrial Economics
43, 49-61.
26Table 1: Summary Statistics for Asset Tangibility
This table displays summary statistics for asset tangibility. There are three measures of asset tangibility. The ￿rst is based on a
￿rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (as in Berger et al. (1996)) and the second on an industry-level measure of
asset redeployability based on Census data. These two measures are continuous. The third tangibility measure is based on Sharpe￿ s
(1994) industry ￿durability,￿where a value of 1 is assigned to ￿rms belonging to nondurable goods industries. The sampled ￿rms
include only manufacturers (SICs 2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985 through 2000.
Mean Median Std. Dev. Pct. 10 Pct. 25 Pct. 75 Pc.t 90 N
Asset Tangibility Measures
1. Firm Liquidation Values 0.526 0.537 0.169 0.262 0.324 0.686 0.739 17,880
2. Industry Asset Liquidity 0.074 0.059 0.052 0.026 0.038 0.099 0.136 11,826
3. Industry Durability 0.464 0 0.499 0 0 1 1 18,304Table 2: Summary Statistics of Investment, Q, and Cash Flow, across Low- and High-Tangibility Firms
This table displays summary statistics for investment, Q, and cash ￿ ows across groups of low- and high-tangibility ￿rms. Investment
is de￿ned as the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #128) to beginning-of-period capital stock (lagged item #8). Q
is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (= (item #6 + (item #24 ￿ item #25) ￿item #60 ￿
item #74) / (item #6)). CashFlow is earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation (item #18 + item #14) divided by the
beginning-of-period capital stock. There are three measures of asset tangibility. The ￿rst is based on a ￿rm-level proxy for expected
value of assets in liquidation and the second on an industry-level measure of asset redeployment. These two measures are continuous and
we de￿ne as low-tangibility (high-tangibility) ￿rms those ￿rms ranked in the bottom (top) three deciles of the tangibility distribution.
The third tangibility measure is based on Sharpe￿ s (1994) industry ￿durability,￿where low-tangibility (high-tangibility) ￿rms are those
in the durables (nondurables) industries. The sampled ￿rms include only manufacturers (SICs 2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985
through 2000.
Investment Q CashFlow N
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Asset Tangibility Measures
1. Firm Liquidation Values
Low-Tangibility Firms 0.219 0.210 0.148 0.997 0.960 0.429 0.319 0.306 0.667 5,364
High-Tangibility Firms 0.266 0.218 0.229 1.024 0.966 0.460 0.401 0.384 0.683 5,364
2. Industry Asset Liquidity
Low-Tangibility Firms 0.241 0.185 0.208 1.032 0.922 0.371 0.331 0.264 0.547 3,547
High-Tangibility Firms 0.255 0.206 0.198 0.989 0.919 0.400 0.387 0.353 0.495 3,546
3. Industry Durability
Low-Tangibility Firms 0.252 0.199 0.206 1.008 0.992 0.415 0.342 0.315 0.713 9,782
High-Tangibility Firms 0.216 0.183 0.155 0.988 0.928 0.381 0.323 0.290 0.494 8,522Table 3: Investment￿ Cash Flow Sensitivity and Tangibility: Endogenous Constraint Selection (Baseline Switching
Regression Model)
This table displays results from the investment regressions in the switching regression model (Eqs. (8)￿ (10) in the text). These
equations are estimated with ￿rm- and time-￿xed e⁄ects. Switching regression estimations allow for endogenous selection into
￿￿nancially constrained￿and ￿￿nancially unconstrained￿categories via maximum likelihood methods. Panel B of Table 3 reports
the coe¢ cients from the ￿regime selection￿regressions, where Tangibility (various de￿nitions) and the selection variables employed
in Hovakimian and Titman (2004) are used to assign ￿rms into constraint categories. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT
industrial tapes. The sampled ￿rms include only manufacturers (SICs 2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985 through 2000.
The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (in
parentheses).
Panel A: Main Regressions ￿Financial constraints assignments use tangibility and the proxies of Hovakimian and Titman (2004)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables N
Investment Q CashFlow Tangibility CashFlow￿
Tangibility
Asset Tangibility Measures
1. Firm Liquidation Values
Constrained Firms 0.0819** ￿ 0.0270** 0.0342 0.4898** 17,880
(10.77) (￿ 2.26) (1.44) (8.99)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0639** 0.0598* 0.0176 ￿ 0.0873
(2.64) (2.27) (0.62) (￿ 1.46)
2. Industry Asset Liquidity
Constrained Firms 0.0801** 0.0373** 0.0211 0.3923** 11,826
(7.00) (3.10) (1.26) (5.01)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0648** 0.0905** 0.0668 0.0711
(4.06) (4.14) (0.80) (0.82)
3. Industry Durability
Constrained Firms 0.0561** 0.0849** 0.0133 0.0492** 18,304
(5.44) (3.09) (1.09) (2.88)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0335** 0.1454** 0.0197 ￿ 0.0147
(3.25) (8.65) (1.52) (￿ 0.86)
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 3.: ￿ Continued
For each of the estimations reported in this panel (one for each of three proxies for asset tangibility), the dependent variable is
coded 1 for assignment into investment regime 1, and 0 for assignment into investment regime 2. As explained in the text, ￿rms
assigned into investment regime 1 are classi￿ed as ￿nancially constrained, and those assigned into investment regime 2 are classi￿ed as
￿nancially unconstrained. This classi￿cation is based on theoretical priors about which ￿rm characteristics are likely to be associated
with ￿nancial constraints. Each of the selection variables is entered in lagged form. LogBookAssets is the natural logarithm of
total book assets (item #6). LogAge is the natural log of the number of years the ￿rm appears in the COMPUSTAT tapes since
1971. DummyDivPayout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ￿rm has made any cash dividend payments. ShortTermDebt
is the ratio of short-term debt (item #34) to total assets. LongTermDebt is the ratio of long-term debt (item #9) to total assets.
GrowthOpportunities is the ratio of market to book value of assets. DummyBondRating is a dummy variable that equals 1 is the
￿rm has a bond rating assigned by Standard & Poors. FinancialSlack is the ratio of cash and liquid securities (item #1) to lagged
assets. Tangibility is measured according to various ￿rm- and industry-level measures (see text for details). The estimations correct
the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (in parentheses). The last row
reports P-values for the test of the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is su¢ cient to describe the data.
Panel B: Endogenous Selection Regressions
Asset Tangibility Measures
Firm Liq. Values Industry Liquidity Industry Durability
Regime Selection Variables
LogBookAssets ￿ 0.3248** ￿ 0.2811** ￿ 0.2271**
(￿ 8.97) (￿ 9.34) (￿ 10.98)
LogAge ￿ 0.4097** ￿ 0.3277** ￿ 0.2355**
(￿ 10.96) (￿ 15.69) (￿ 8.24)
DummyDivPayout ￿ 0.1833** ￿ 0.2479** ￿ 0.1976**
(￿ 7.48) (￿ 11.90) (￿ 10.50)
ShortTermDebt 0.0919 0.0293 0.0274
(0.22) (0.12) (0.05)
LongTermDebt 0.1551 0.0924 0.0714
(1.22) (1.02) (0.66)
GrowthOpportunities 0.2609** 0.2719** 0.2246**
(9.30) (8.82) (8.01)
DummyBondRating ￿ 0.1757** ￿ 0.2066** ￿ 0.1855**
(￿ 6.02) (￿ 8.09) (￿ 5.11)
FinancialSlack 0.2719** 0.2980** 0.2985**
(8.42) (9.32) (7.42)
Tangibility ￿ 0.0994** ￿ 0.0766** ￿ 0.1255**
(￿ 7.15) (￿ 6.98) (￿ 7.42)
Model P-value (Likelihood Ratio Test) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 4: Investment￿ Cash Flow Sensitivity and Tangibility: Ex-ante Constraint Selection (Standard Regressions)
This table displays OLS-FE (￿rm and year e⁄ects) estimation results of the augmented investment model (Eq. (7) in the text). The
estimations use pre-determined ￿rm selection into ￿￿nancially constrained￿and ￿￿nancially unconstrained￿categories. Constraint
category assignments use on ex-ante criteria based on ￿rm dividend payout, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see
text for details). All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes. The sampled ￿rms include only manufacturers (SICs
2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985 through 2000. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and
clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Tangibility proxyed by firm-level liquidation values (based on Berger et al. (1996))
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N




Constrained Firms 0.0671** ￿ 0.0715** ￿ 0.0501 0.3451** 0.118 5,697
(4.35) (￿ 5.55) (￿ 0.94) (5.63)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0380** 0.2042* 0.0273 ￿ 0.0439 0.149 5,327
(2.72) (2.35) (0.40) (￿ 0.31)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0623** ￿ 0.1066** ￿ 0.1053 0.3985** 0.103 4,854
(3.83) (￿ 5.46) (￿ 1.56) (8.14)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0543** 0.1901* 0.0996 ￿ 0.1652 0.114 5,300
(3.71) (2.43) (1.32) (￿ 1.14)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0862** ￿ 0.0926** ￿ 0.1112 0.3260** 0.106 11,748
(7.64) (￿ 5.97) (￿ 1.41) (6.59)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0402** 0.0623 ￿ 0.0177 0.0953 0.091 5,091
(3.73) (0.96) (￿ 0.35) (0.87)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0841** ￿ 0.0897** ￿ 0.1215 0.3588** 0.099 14,194
(8.51) (￿ 6.03) (￿ 1.78) (7.06)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0353* 0.0908* 0.0071 0.1177 0.138 2,645
(2.51) (2.02) (0.12) (1.42)
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 4: ￿ Continued
Panel B: Tangibility proxyed by industry-level asset liquidity (based on redeployment of used capital)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N




Constrained Firms 0.0711** 0.0591** ￿ 0.0359 0.5781** 0.078 3,387
(4.05) (2.70) (￿ 0.41) (3.84)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0565** 0.0934** 0.1276 ￿ 0.2328 0.142 3,117
(3.37) (5.58) (1.21) (￿ 1.15)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0820** 0.0881** 0.0633 0.2952* 0.100 3,104
(4.30) (3.75) (0.62) (2.28)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0753** 0.0725** ￿ 0.0820 ￿ 0.3448 0.114 3,117
(4.42) (3.40) (￿ 0.56) (￿ 1.08)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0914** 0.0660* ￿ 0.0083 0.5048** 0.117 6,889
(7.09) (2.36) (￿ 0.08) (2.94)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0576** 0.1078** ￿ 0.0799 0.0607 0.092 3,169
(4.03) (3.00) (￿ 0.75) (0.28)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0900** 0.0682** ￿ 0.0127 0.4631** 0.109 8,471
(7.71) (2.88) (￿ 0.14) (3.23)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0313** 0.1552** ￿ 0.1371 0.0454 0.143 1,587
(3.22) (6.19) (￿ 0.85) (0.21)
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 4: ￿ Continued
Panel C: Tangibility proxyed by product durability (based on Sharpe￿ s (1994) industry dichotomy)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N




Constrained Firms 0.0738** 0.0501** ￿ 0.0290 0.0552** 0.095 6,443
(7.53) (3.62) (￿ 1.73) (2.97)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0220 0.1602** 0.0050 ￿ 0.0388 0.233 5,497
(1.59) (8.80) (0.52) (￿ 1.54)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0537** 0.1208** ￿ 0.0150 0.0668** 0.099 5,497
(4.15) (5.80) (￿ 1.45) (3.27)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0546** 0.0740** ￿ 0.0111 ￿ 0.0575* 0.249 5,497
(4.28) (3.40) (￿ 0.90) (￿2.37)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1051** 0.0737** ￿ 0.0403* 0.0491* 0.088 13,213
(8.51) (4.91) (￿ 2.43) (2.14)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0314** 0.1326** ￿ 0.0127 ￿ 0.0281 0.185 5,091
(3.12) (6.10) (￿ 1.40) (￿ 0.95)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0958** 0.0851** ￿ 0.0446** 0.0573** 0.095 15,659
(8.58) (6.49) (￿ 2.36) (3.03)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0151 0.1333** ￿ 0.0020 ￿ 0.0394* 0.226 2,645
(1.35) (6.01) (￿ 0.14) (￿ 2.20)
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Regressions in this panel include only year e⁄ects.Table 5: Robustness Checks: Measurement Errors in Q
This table reports results from estimators used to address measurement errors in the proxy for investment opportunities, Q, from the
baseline regression model (Eq. (7) in the text). Each cell displays the estimates of the coe¢ cients returned for CashFlow￿Tangibility
and the associated test statistics. The estimations use pre-determined ￿rm selection into ￿￿nancially constrained￿and ￿￿nancially
unconstrained￿categories. Tangibility is the ￿rm-level proxy for asset liquidation values (based on Berger et al. (1996)). The ￿rst
set of estimations (row 1) follows Cummins et al.￿ s (1999) GMM procedure where Q is instrumented with analysts￿earnings forecasts.
The second set of estimations (row 2) uses the Erickson￿ Whited (2000) GMM5 estimator. The estimations of row 3 are based on
Bond and Meghir (1994), where lags of investment, sales, and debt are added as controls and instrumented (estimated via GMM).
All estimations control for ￿rm- and year-￿xed e⁄ects. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes. The sampled
￿rms include only manufacturers (SICs 2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985 through 2000. The estimations correct the error
structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering. t-statistics (in parentheses). Hansen￿ s J-statistics for overidentifying restrictions tests
[in square brackets].
Dependent Variable Financial Constraints Criteria
Investment Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
1. Cummins et al. Estimator
Constrained Firms 0.2976** 0.4420** 0.2474** 0.2174**
(3.19) (5.78) (2.99) (2.63)
[0.26] [0.22] [0.26] [0.29]
Unconstrained Firms ￿0.0752 ￿0.2413 ￿ 0.0470 0.0035
(￿0.46) (￿1.51) (￿ 0.36) (0.67)
[0.52] [0.55] [0.17] [0.27]
2. Erickson￿ Whited Estimator
Constrained Firms N/A 0.4710** N/A 0.2490**
(2.91) (2.66)
[028] [0.17]
Unconstrained Firms N/A ￿ 0.1230 N/A ￿ 0.0240
(￿ 0.51) (￿ 0.08)
[0.19] [0.32]
3. Bond￿ Meghir Estimator
Constrained Firms 0.3123** 0.5109** 0.3566** 0.3243**
(2.83) (3.69) (3.77) (4.10)
[0.24] [0.18] [0.39] [0.16]
Unconstrained Firms 0.0111 0.0164 0.0554 ￿0.0477
(0.43) (0.45) (0.86) (￿0.76)
[0.31] [0.18] [0.19] [0.25]
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.Table 6: Fixed Capital and R&D Expenditures
This table displays results from the R&D expenditures model (Eq. (12)), where Investment is instrumented (b I). Switching regression
estimations allow for endogenous selection into ￿￿nancially constrained￿and ￿￿nancially unconstrained￿categories via maximum
likelihood methods. The table reports only the coe¢ cients from the ￿main￿investment regressions. The ￿regime selection￿regressions
use Tangibility (various de￿nitions) and the selection variables employed in Hovakimian and Titman (2004) to assign ￿rms into
constraint categories. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes. The sampled ￿rms include only manufacturers
(SICs 2000￿ 3999) and the sample period is 1985 through 2000. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and
clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (in parentheses).
Main Regressions ￿Financial constraints assignments use tangibility and the proxies of Hovakimian and Titman (2004)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables N
R&D Expenditures b I CashFlow Tangibility CashFlow￿
Tangibility
Asset Tangibility Measures
1. Firm Liquidation Values
Constrained Firms 0.5298** 0.0605* ￿ 0.0019 ￿ 0.0816 15,077
(2.58) (2.25) (￿ 0.60) (￿ 1.36)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3848* 0.1699** ￿ 0.0673 ￿ 0.0623
(2.09) (4.27) (￿ 1.52) (￿ 1.10)
2. Industry Asset Liquidity
Constrained Firms 0.6673** 0.0557* 0.0296 ￿ 0.0969 10,678
(3.35) (2.00) (1.29) (￿ 1.29)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3249* 0.1300** 0.0275 ￿ 0.1169
(2.08) (3.27) (1.20) (￿ 1.45)
3. Industry Durability
Constrained Firms 0.6897** 0.0444 ￿ 0.0094 ￿ 0.0265 16,527
(3.77) (1.75) (￿ 0.66) (￿ 1.83)
Unconstrained Firms 0.5614** 0.0697* 0.0257 ￿ 0.0078
(2.66) (2.22) (1.14) (￿ 0.61)
Notes: **,* indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 1- and 5-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.